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The Pop Industry from Stagnation to Perestroika: How Music Professionals Embraced 
Economic Reform that Broke East European Cultural Networks 
 “Branding a group of thirty-year old performers ‘young’ is a luxury that we can only 
afford at home and in neighbouring countries,” emphasised the director of a Polish popular 
music show staged in Moscow in June 1987. Held to celebrate Soviet-Polish friendship, the 
event resembled numerous international cultural exchanges that the ruling parties and 
ministries of culture in the socialist camp had coordinated since the late 1940s.i During 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, transnational political networks still gave the 
Soviet bloc a strong degree of cultural distinctiveness: so long as political leaders called the 
shots in the socialist camp’s cultural life, Eastern European audiences listened to music that 
was difficult to market in countries where audience demand and 1980s fashions ruled the day. 
But Polish artists visiting Moscow in 1987 were uneasy about the future of international 
cultural exchanges, suggesting that the Soviet market for Polish culture was the relic of a 
bygone era.ii The director cited above represented a vocal group of music professionals who 
implemented Soviet-bloc cultural policies on the ground, but also questioned the priorities of 
their political masters. Over the previous decade, these professionals had grown to believe 
that Soviet-bloc institutions had to reinvent themselves in order to survive. By the 1980s, they 
began to sever the ties that bound Eastern Europe together. 
This article examines the history of the Soviet bloc pop industry, focusing in particular on 
international Polish-Soviet concert tours between the 1970s and the late 1980s.iii  International 
concerts were a consistent element of the cultural landscape in the Soviet bloc. Some coincided 
with major anniversaries or political events; others targetted very specific audiences, such as 
Polish workers in the USSR; and the majority were simply a source of income for state-owned 
impressario agencies. Polish musicians toured the USSR for months on end, performing in 
large concert halls in Moscow, but also in small houses of culture in far-flung corners of the 
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country. Soviet pop tours of Poland were generally shorter, encompassing large festivals as 
well as performances in small, poorly equipped venues.  
The pop music industry offers a unique prism for understanding the politics of reform in 
the Soviet bloc. The history of pop provides insights into the evolution of Soviet and East 
European identity politics beyond the elite cultural circles. Cheap to stage and produce, pop 
provided a means to shape the “views and tastes” of what one Polish official defined as a 
very wide and as yet unrefined audience.iv  A focus on pop further exposes the vicissitudes of 
Soviet bloc cultural diplomacy at a time when the USSR’s relations with its satellite states 
were shaken to the core. Partly because language barriers did not mean as much in music as 
in other spheres of popular culture, pop regularly crossed borders in the socialist camp, but its 
reach and meanings changed significantly after the rise of the Solidarity trade union and 
Gorbachev’s ascension to power. Finally, the history of pop exposes crucial links between 
economic and cultural reform. Pop concerts brought substanial profits for state-owned 
impressario agencies, helping to fund more ambitious forms of cultural production. Because 
pop was a major commercial enterprise, culture industry employees faced dilemmas that 
made them particularly attuned to the need for reform. The rise of television, international 
radio broadcasting, and a global entertainment industry raised questions as to whether East 
European culture could really hold its own in a cosmopolitan environment. Just as Soviet 
television employees faced a major identity crisis, questioning their role as a “cultural 
vanguard” charged with educating the public and seeking instead to cater to viewers’ desires,v 
music professionals sought new ways to sell tickets.vi In sum, my history of pop examines 
how the sometimes contradictory pressures of identity politics, cultural diplomacy, profit, and 
globalization shaped Eastern Europe’s reform politics. 
International concerts were initiated by a network of communist party leaders, ministry of 
culture officials, and so-called “friendship society” activists who insisted that music must 
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spread across borders within the socialist camp. These ideological stalwarts saw popular 
culture as key to defining what made Eastern European countries different from their 
capitalist neighbours after 1968. Television series, for example, demarcated socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe as a space in which work and personal life differed from the 
West.vii With notable exceptions, national television stations created distinct sets of cultural 
references that only made sense within particular countries of the Soviet bloc.viii In contrast, 
pop had a more distinct international dimension. Activists concerned with building strong ties 
across borders believed that international concerts had the potential to demonstrate that the 
Soviet bloc as a whole, and not just its individual states, formed a unique cultural space. In 
this sense, pop was an “Eastern European” identity building project supposed to lend 
legitimacy to Cold War boundaries.  
Soviet-Polish cultural networks also included state-owned impressario agencies that dealt 
with the nitty-gritty organisational matters: Pagart in Poland and Goskontsert in the USSR.ix 
Working within tight budgets approved by the Ministry of Culture and the Arts in Warsaw 
and the Ministry of Culture in Moscow, Pagart and Goskontsert fulfilled government orders 
for popular and classical music concerts. Yet government subsidies were not enough to cover 
the costs of such events. To make a profit or at least to cover their losses, Pagart and 
Goskontsert also held commercially viable concerts on their own initiative. Organising 
international tours, they claimed a large chunk of the money which Polish and Soviet 
performers received from private agencies in the West and state-owned impressarios in other 
countries of the socialist camp. Profits on live music were substantial, but state-owned 
impressarios transferred most of them to central government budgets.x  Although they did not 
speak in one voice, impressario agency employees and contracted artists can be conceived as 
“music professionals”. For them, pop was not only an ideological project. It was first and 
foremost a job, a source of income and professional pride. 
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My history of the music industry exposes important sources of support for market reform 
among mobile mid-level bureaucrats and performers. The ideological and professional 
understandings of pop clashed during the Brezhnev era, as slogans about international socialist 
friendship rang hollow to music professionals who found their work undermined by major 
infrastructural problems. Their frustrations were typical of state-owned enterprises outside the 
heavily-subsidised military-industrial complex, the bloated industrial ministries, and 
agriculture. Professionals in non-priority sectors of the economy such as the service industry 
enjoyed limited autonomy from the state, as a growing share of the profits stayed within the 
enterprise and “employees were awarded regular premiums from special funds.” At the same 
time, through the 1970s, the state retained far-reaching powers to direct enterprise activities 
that put managers between a rock and a hard place: transferring the burden of capital investment 
onto individual enterprises, the state also remained the only source of investment over which 
professionals in charge of those enteprises had “virtually no control.”xi 
To be sure, the origins of economic restructuring that gave managers more power to decide 
how to make and spend money lay among institutions far more powerful than the transnational 
pop impressarios. Reform-minded Party leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe who came to 
power in the 1980s played the lead role.xii Yet while pop music professionals did not call the 
shots during perestroika, their enthusiastic embrace of reform stood in contrast to mid-level 
bureaucrats’ resistance which had frustrated Kosygin’s attempts to devolve more decision-
making powers to the enterprise level in the 1960s,xiii as well as to the cautiousness of Party 
reformers and the hostility of managers in strategic industries of the Soviet bloc who effectively 
resisted market reform during the 1980s.xiv While East European officials involved in the 
import of Soviet oil and gas had little interest in reform, believing that trade arrangements 
benefitted the Soviet satellites at the expense of the USSR itself, xv pop music professionals in 
Poland jumped at the opportunity to gain more control over their enterprise and to intensify 
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work outside the socialist camp as soon as Wojciech Jaruzelski launched economic reforms in 
the first half of the 1980s.xvi In the context of ambiguous legal changes that did not clearly 
delineate the revamped role of the enterprise in 1987,xvii Soviet pop professionals were likewise 
eager to decide what music to sell, how much to charge for their services, and how to allocate 
profits. As other professionals involved in foreign trade, they sought to increase exports across 
the Iron Curtain and to retain control over a greater share of hard-currency profits, ultimately 
creating their “own profit based companies from within the state economic bureaucracy”.xviii 
Whereas “free trade” had long been part of Soviet economic thinking,xix Polish and then Soviet 
pop professionals fought against their respective ministries of culture to establish “free 
enterprises.”xx  
Pop industry employees appropriated the economic and institutional reforms launched by 
Party leaders to help bring about a cultural reorientation of the Soviet bloc. Mainstream 
culture of the USSR and its satellite states is often studied as if it was controlled by the 
highest echelons of the Communist Party driven by the imperative to create a distinctly 
“socialist civilization,”xxi  with little agency ascribed to the professionals responsible for 
implementing cultural policy. Bradford Martin thus shows the continuing power of the KGB 
to suppress Goskontsert initiatives in the USSR, portraying Brezhnev-era musical life as a 
function of ideological tensions “between promoting socialist consumption to build a society 
that outstripped capitalism … and recourse to more traditional Soviet strategies of secrecy 
and distrust to preserve social order and stability.”xxii In contrast, my history of pop reveals 
the agendas of officials and performers beyond the elite circles whose work was clearly 
distinct from those forms of cultural expression which, in the Party’s view, embodied 
“socialist” values and represented the “socialist world” on the international arena.xxiii Already 
skeptical about the East European identity building mission of music in the 1970s, Brezhnev-
era pop professionals in both Poland and the USSR resembled Kristin Roth-Ey’s Soviet 
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television employees who mimicked Western cultural forms but still promoted Party-
sponsored visions of socialist culture (kul’turnost’), even at the cost of “[boring] their 
audiences to tears”.xxiv With the expanding limits of enterprise autonomy during the 1980s, 
they undermined networks that marked the socialist world as a cultural space distinct from 
the capitalist West.  
Pop was of course one among many cultural phenomena that reflected loosening 
ideological controls in the Soviet bloc, but its impact on the decline of “socialist” identities 
was significant. Pop professionals sold millions of tickets and records every year,  promoted 
their music on radio and television, and launched the careers of performers whose popularity 
spanned the socialist and capitalist eras.xxv Unlike underground rock musicians and guitar 
ballad singers whose music was distributed through the semi-legal means of 
“magnitizdat”,xxvi in contrast to the peddlers and fans of Western music who engaged in 
smuggling, illegal trade, and even dissent,xxvii and distinct from Alexei Yurchak’s young 
Leningraders who created and consumed music within localised networks of friends and 
acquaintances, pop professionals did not see the structures of Brezhnev-era socialism as an 
unmovable foundation on which to carve out social and cultural spaces “outside” official 
culture. xxviii  They rather shifted the limits of the “mainstream” against which the much 
better-studied subcultural groups defined their own identities.  
Historians of perestroika have focused on Mikhail Gorbachev’s struggles against anti-
reformist lobby groups which ultimately ensured that major Soviet industries remained 
dominated by “insiders”, with the government in post-Soviet Russia retaining the power to 
regulate strategic sectors of the economy “through direct distribution and not the market.”xxix 
But perestroika was not just a search for “socialism with a human face” driven by the 
increasingly isolated Gorbachev. Neither was it simply the culmination of popular protests 
which rocked Poland during the 1980s.xxx This article highlights the excitement associated with 
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the period of economic transition by offering a glimpse into the mindsets of ambitious 
professionals outside the heavily subsidized sectors of the economy, and especially those who 
managed the socialist camp’s interface with the outside world. These professionals grew 
disillusioned with promises to improve the quality of life within the existing economic and 
institutional structures of state socialism and saw market reform as the most promising path to 
raise wages, to work in comfortable conditions, and to deliver better quality products.xxxi 
Mobile mid-level bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and performers helped shape public culture of the 
Soviet bloc by refocusing Eastern European institutions away from “need” and towards 
“demand.”xxxii Artists on tour did not “need” to stay in good quality hotels and audiences did 
not “need” to listen to fashionable music in heated venues with decent acoustics. But by the 
late socialist period professionals in the pop industry wanted more than just what they needed. 
Music Ideologues 
Communist Party officials and activists of friendship societies on both sides of the Soviet-
Polish border used popular music to create the image of Eastern Europe as a distinct cultural 
entity.  
Apparatchiks at the culture department of the Party Central Committee in Warsaw singled 
out pop as a particularly important means of promoting a “socialist lifestyle” in the 
1970s.xxxiii This term was shorthand for the propaganda notion that life behind the Iron 
Curtain, though poorer than in the capitalist West, was also more secure and personally 
fulfilling.xxxiv Official emphasis on socialist lifestyle dictated that Soviet bloc entertainment 
had to be easily accessible to blue-collar workers. As Polish bands toured the USSR and gave 
dozens of ticketed concerts from Lviv to Vladivostok, Pagart and Goskontsert made pop 
“socialist” by obliging singers to stage several free daytime performances at large factories. 
From the performers’ point of view, this made for a hectic schedule. Anna German, a Polish 
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singer of Soviet origin who enjoyed great popularity in the USSR, hardly led a glamorous 
lifestyle during a concert tour of Ukraine in 1979. Having arrived on a bus from a concert in 
the provincial town of Zhytomyr, she gave two evening shows and one lunchtime 
performance at a Kyiv factory in the space of twenty-four hours, before setting off to Kharkiv 
on an overnight train.xxxv Pop music professionals, including the biggest celebrities, were 
state employees and their work reflected the political and ideological priorities of the ruling 
parties. 
Apart from the outward manifestations of class loyalties, Party officials expected pop to 
promote what they deemed to be high culture among audiences otherwise interested in 
entertainment. Soviet pop concerts in Poland were planned to coincide with theatre and 
classical music festivals.xxxvi When the Polish singer Marek Grechuta toured provincial 
Soviet towns in 1976, for example, presenters who introduced him spoke at length about the 
Polish Theatre Festival in Moscow.xxxvii Relegating Grechuta to the role of attracting 
audiences to the theatre, state and Party leaders were rather dismissive of the singer’s own 
poetic repertoire. The Polish Ministry of Culture was keen to preserve clear cultural 
hierarchies, as the minister Witaszyński argued that it was unbecoming of young performers 
like Grechuta to sing their own lyrics set to their own music.xxxviii Soviet bloc officials in 
charge of music presented thesemselves as a cultural “vanguard” with a responsibility to 
propagate high-brow culture and they remained suspicious of young talent. 
In line with the broader emphasis on the educational role of entertainment, pop concerts 
carried a clear message about the USSR’s political domination in Eastern Europe. The idea 
was that Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe was based on friendship.xxxix The presenters 
whom Goskontsert sent to accompany each Polish artist touring the USSR not only 
summarised song lyrics for audiences who did not speak Polish, but also highlighted 
examples of Polish-Soviet economic and political cooperation. They also suggested that 
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Soviet and Polish citizens resembled each other, introducing Polish performers in such a way 
as to create an idealised image of mature, socialist society. Polish friends on tour in the USSR 
were thus celebrated as teachers of Russian language, seamstresses on maternity leave and, of 
course, blue-collar workers. All performers supposedly came from modest families, but 
cultivated their talents in extra-curricular clubs.xl This image of “developed socialism” 
emphasised equality of opportunity and welfare as key characteristics of Soviet-style regimes. 
Pop’s mission to solidify the cultural unity of the Soviet bloc was most clearly manifested 
in the annual Soviet song competition organised by the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society in 
Poland. Held from 1961, the competition attracted Polish amateurs who performed popular 
Soviet songs with the hope of launching a professional music career. In preparation for the 
competition, the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society in Warsaw published twenty thousand 
books with Soviet songs that were then sent to the society’s regional branches, schools, and 
local houses of culture throughout Poland. Regional cultural activists subsequently organised 
multi-level competitions for amateur performers that culminated in a televised final concert in 
the town of Zielona Góra. The competition and the final concert became increasingly popular 
with over 100,000 participants each year across the 1970s.xli The Polish-Soviet Friendship 
Society used the competition to attract members: early rounds held in factories or small 
villages were thus combined with elections to the society’s leadership.xlii Across the border, 
the Soviet-Polish Friendship Society and Goskontsert invited the finalists to tour the 
USSR.xliii 
I. Music Professionals 
Impressario agencies which organised international concert tours undermined the guiding 
role of communist parties in Eastern Europe’s cultural life insofar as they ensured that 
audiences dictated taste and style. During Marek Grechuta’s tour of the USSR in autumn 
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1976, Soviet youth were reportedly disappointed to hear lyrical songs set to string 
instruments and the piano. They passed notes to the stage demanding rock-and-roll repertoire 
and covers of Western hits instead.xliv These requests did not fall on deaf ears as Polish and 
Soviet Ukrainian stage directors eliminated Grechuta’s songs from a concert that marked the 
opening of Polish Literature Days in Kyiv in 1977. Pagart suggested that future events of this 
nature should focus instead on more “showy” national folk dances and feature television stars 
such as Pola Raksa - known in Poland and the USSR for her good looks and a role in Four 
Tank Drivers and a Dog, a very popular television series about Polish-Soviet camaraderie 
during World War Two.xlv Music professionals developed practical ways to respond to 
audience demand. They challenged traditional cultural hierarchies by creating opportunities 
for the audience to judge performers.xlvi 
Audience demand mattered partly because, for the impressario agencies, pop music had to 
turn a profit. Although Soviet officials seemed reluctant to admit this openly in the 1970s, 
staging pop concerts was key to the financial stability of Goskontsert – following Party 
directives to focus more on classical music and less on entertainment, the agency found it 
more difficult to balance the books.xlvii To sell “socialist friendship” to an increasingly 
demanding audience, impressario agencies fostered the rise of a celebrity culture. The Polish 
Party leadership was clearly aware that it was only through charging high prices for pop 
concerts by particuarly famous performers that state-owned impressario agencies stayed 
afloat.xlviii Apparatchiks at the Central Committee in Warsaw even claimed that, at the height 
of their popularity in the 1970s, the popular band Czerwone Gitary generated a higher 
turnover than a large industrial plant.xlix Though Pagart derived a major share of its profits 
from exporting musicians to clubs and restaurants in the capitalist West, sending popular 
performers such as Breakout or Jerzy Połomski to the USSR likewise brought profits in 
Eastern Europe’s international currency, the transferable rouble.l Pagart made still more 
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money by importing Soviet stars to tour Poland.li They therefore displayed a clear preference 
for big names, competing to book major Soviet stars such as Alla Pugacheva,lii while refusing 
to even meet lesser known Soviet singers on tour in Poland.liii 
The commercial side of Soviet bloc pop music was most palpable in the socialist camp’s 
response to Eurovision. The annual international song festival in the Polish seaside resort of 
Sopot was founded by Władysław Szpilman, a leading figure in the Polish pop music 
industry and the protagonist of Roman Polański’s The Pianist (2002). Sopot was an 
expensive affair. In the mid-1970s, the Polish Ministry of Culture and Arts did not fund it at 
all, which put a major strain on the budget of Pagart and the Sopot tourist board that 
organised the festival and sold broadcasting rights to radio and television.liv Soviet and East 
European record labels and impressario agencies sent performers to Sopot in the hope of 
selling records and promoting performers in other people’s democracies and, largely 
unsuccessfully, beyond Eastern Europe and the USSR. To attract television and radio 
audiences throughout the Soviet bloc to broadcasts from Sopot, Pagart invited not only East 
European celebrities, but also Boney M and other expensive performers from beyond the Iron 
Curtain.lv 
Attempts to respond to audience demand soon fuelled anxieties about Westernisation and 
the loss of a distinct Eastern European cultural identity. Party leaders in Warsaw were 
frustrated that radio professionals ignored their directives and, particularly in programmes 
geared towards the youth, played Western pop and rock instead of Polish, Soviet, and East 
European estrada.lvi Concerns about the popularity of Western music, framed sometimes in 
very ethnocentric and even racial terms, were shared by Polish composers and lyricists who 
stood to lose their royalties. The radio “favours … artists peforming in the Negro style,” 
bemoaned one report signed by several prominent pop music composers in July 1977.lvii 
Some composers further complained that Western record labels offered free copies of their 
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music to Polish radio DJs and thereby undermined the Polish music industry. lviii The 
composers’ response to these pressures was to adapt Polish music in line with Western trends 
(as they claimed, they thus ended up composing melodies best suited for the English 
language, which made it difficult to write meaningful Polish lyrics).lix The limited influence 
of the Polish Party on mainstream popular culture was clear as officials at the Central 
Committee employed tired slogans about the need for entertainment to “reflect the 
romanticism of the contemporary” (newspeak for “portray life in socialist Eastern Europe in 
positive terms”), but also complained that pop composers simply mimicked Western music.lx 
On the Soviet side, audience demand also frustrated attempts to create a pan-socialist popular 
culture. For young people in particular, Western music was less easily accessible but also 
more attractive than East European estrada.lxi It also seems that Soviet audiences preferred 
Soviet pop songs over Eastern European repertoire.lxii  
II. The 1970s: a latent conflict 
Although the term “stagnation” was not used during the late Brezhnev era, cultural 
confrontations in the socialist camp pushed many music professionals to paint a rather 
depressing picture of the late 1970s in the late 1970s.  The ambition to create attractive forms 
of entertainment was a constant source of frustration as impressario agency employees found 
that Soviet bloc institutions were not up to the task. In their portrayals, everyday life during 
the late Brezhnev era appears difficult, plagued by incompetence, alcoholism, and malice. In 
diagnosing the problems of Soviet-bloc pop industry during the 1970s, music professionals 
echoed the narratives of late Soviet popular culture which turned “indifference” 
(ravnodushiie) into a central public concern.lxiii In particular, they blamed provincial 
bureaucrats’ indifference for the sorry state of musical instruments and concert halls. In this 
sense, music professionals largely operated within the limits of a distinct Eastern European 
culture during the 1970s.  
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Pop musicians in the Soviet bloc staged many performances in provincial towns. 
Contemporary reports reveal that many found such work difficult. Polish performers in the 
USSR complained that they were accommodated in shabby, shared hotel rooms, even though 
their tickets sold out at expensive prices, suggesting that Goskontsert and the philharmonics 
pocketed too much for themselves.lxiv More alarming for the music professionals was the 
state of the provincial venues that hosted performers on tour. The lack of proper equipment 
made for bad music. In Brest, for example, concerts at the electromechanical factory were 
held to the accompaniment of an old piano brought in at the last moment from the local 
school.lxv  
Infrastractural problems fuelled criticism of Soviet bureaucrats in small towns, villages, 
as well as in the non-Russian parts of the USSR. In internal reports intended for Polish 
consumption only, the Soviet Union of the 1970s appeared grotesque. Polish bands’ 
instruments were regularly damaged in transit across the USSR and, as one report 
emphasised, provincial and rural houses of culture could not generate electrical current strong 
enough to allow for the use of modern sound equipment.lxvi Central Asia and Azerbaijan were 
especially difficult to work in, Pagart claimed.lxvii Pagart employees were frustrated by the 
apparent complacency and disrespect for rules among Soviet bureaucrats. A 1976 report 
despaired that one Polish band visiting Naberezhnye Chelny in Tatarstan performed in a 
house of culture with no backstage, changing rooms, or heating. A Pagart official who 
accompanied the group emphasised that much better venues were available in the area, but 
staff at the Kazan philharmonic did not care to arrange the tour properly.lxviii 
On the Soviet side, some Goskontsert officials focused on Polish performers’ ego as the 
source of all problems. While a Pagart report celebrated the success of young Polish singers 
in the USSR in September 1977 (the “only unpleasant part of the trip” was when one of the 
artists slashed his wrists in Murmansk),lxix the group’s Russian interpreter took a distinctly 
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more negative view of their tour. The group’s most successful performer, Grażyna 
Łobaszewska, falsely accused a hotel cleaner of stealing a bag of bananas. Meanwhile, the 
group’s guitarist “abused the interpreter’s time,” demanding “countless free medical 
consultations” for his “chronic hemorrhoids.”lxx In other cases, echoing Polish reports, 
Moscow-based Goskontsert staff blamed poor quality concerts on bureaucrats and music 
professionals in the provinces. Blat (or the importance of personal connections) was a source 
of embarassment for a Goskontsert guide on tour with the Polish group Budka Suflera. She 
informed her superiors that the band were only provided with decent accommodation in 
Kazan because one musician happened to know the number one Soviet celebrity, Alla 
Pugacheva, who “caused a scene” at the local philharmonic.lxxi 
In discussing problems plaguing the Soviet-bloc music industry, Pagart and Goskontsert 
reports hinted at wider problems of transport, infrastructure, management, and shortages (the 
bag of bananas was clearly a prized possession). Yet they placed much more explicit 
emphasis on personality. In this vein, a Goskontsert guide and interpreter N.Ia. Gebgart who 
accompanied the Polish group Skaldowie on a three-month tour of the USSR, accused some 
concert venue directors of plain malice. She thus emphasised that, although a local Georgian 
band kindly lent Skaldowie powerful amplifiers to perform at the large Sports Palace in 
Tbilisi, the venue director did not allow the Polish band to use this equipment and even cut 
one of their concerts short.lxxii To be sure, reports focusing on personality provided shaky 
grounds for diagnosing the problems plaguing pop. In fact, Gebgart’s character assessments 
stood in stark contrast to the opinions of a Polish guide who accompanied Skaldowie on the 
same tour. Stefan Szatkowski stressed that Tbilisi Sports Palace staff were in fact friendly 
and stopped the concert in question because Skaldowie were drunk. As a testament to the 
importance of personal relations in the Soviet-bloc music industry, Szatkowski’s report 
blamed Gebgart herself for tensions on tour. Skaldowie got on very well with Gebgart who 
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joined their late night parties and, after unwelcome advances from a group of men 
encountered in a hotel, moved into one room with two band members and a female colleague 
from Goskontsert. As Szatkowski put it, “sending two young women to accompany young 
men [on tour] for a prolonged period of time has predictable consequences… This makes 
[my] job … much more complicated.”lxxiii 
Given their focus on personality, it should come as no surprise that music professionals 
sought to treat the ailing Soviet-Polish cultural exchanges in distinctly personal ways. For 
Gebgart, empathy was the key to improving international concert tours. “I described the tour 
… in so much detail,” she addressed her superiors in Moscow, “to help you understand what 
it is like to give concerts in different towns everyday.”lxxiv Despairing that Skaldowie’s 
drunken antics could sabotage Pagart’s future exports to the USSR, Szatkowski similarly 
offered solutions that focused on personality. Skaldowie were to be banned from foreign 
tours in the following years and, because drinking reached its peak when the band performed 
for Polish builders on Soviet construction sites, artists whose itineraries contained such 
concerts were to be screened for any “alcoholic tendencies.”lxxv  
Only infrequently, and mostly in Poland, were infrastructural problems plaguing the 
international music industry raised openly. Shortages featured prominently in music 
professionals’ reports to party central committees, as well as in internal communist party 
reports drawing on information obtained from music professionals. Senior apparatchiks in 
Warsaw stressed that the promotion of Polish performers in the USSR was frustrated by 
insufficient numbers of LPs and cassette tapes.lxxvi More daringly, state-owned impressario 
agencies sometimes complained about excessive government control. Shortages of hard 
currency necessary to purchase products outside the Soviet bloc were particularly burning. 
Pagart leaders found they needed to plea for relatively small amounts from the Ministry of 
Culture and the Arts even as they brought in substantial US dollar profits. In March 1980, for 
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example, Pagart stressed they would need 18,500 US dollars over the next two years to pay 
for high quality printing paper for advertising purposes (this was in a year when Pagart’s 
reported US dollar profits amounted to just under 1,300,000). Pagart was keen to retain 
control over a larger share of its own hard currency profits at the expense of contributions to 
the Polish state budget, arguing that this would facilitate the import of music and the 
promotion of Polish performers abroad.lxxvii  
Complaints about systemic tensions between Polish and Soviet cultural institutions can 
rarely be gleaned. Pagart officials implied that they were not treated as equal partners in the 
USSR, reminding the Central Committee in Warsaw that the official exchange rate of the 
Soviet rouble to the Polish złoty was unfavourable for the Poles. The response was to work 
around the system, as Polish artists unable to exchange their roubles at a decent rate sought 
legal ways to purchase “attractive Soviet goods” to sell in Poland (this likely meant gold, 
vodka, and furs).lxxviii Polish performers in the USSR got paid less than Soviet artists in 
Poland.lxxix In some cases, Pagart even covered part of the salaries of Polish performers 
touring the USSR.lxxx Such divisive financial issues were not successfuly resolved, as it 
seems that Soviet and Polish organisations shied away from open confrontation. When Pagart 
rejected Goskontsert’s proposals to raise salaries for Polish classical musicians touring the 
USSR at the expense of pop performers, further discussion was postponed indefinitely.lxxxi In 
1976, Pagart officials complained that Soviet-Polish cultural exchanges were based on 
“haggling.”lxxxii  
III. The early 1980s: an open conflict 
Following the rise of the Solidarity trade union and the introduction of martial law in 
Poland, international concert tours between Poland and the USSR were severely cut down in 
1981 and almost came to a halt in the following year. This pushed music professionals to 
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look beyond established practices and thus gave an important impetus for change in Soviet-
bloc cultural exchanges. 
The need to sell their products and services had long been a concern for enterprise 
managers in the Soviet bloc.lxxxiii In the context of regulated prices and monopolies, attempts 
to control production quality and labour efficiency through sales indicators were largely 
counterproductive,lxxxiv but commercial considerations became more central for state-owned 
enterprise managers in Poland from 1981. After Solidarity highlighted the depths of the 
socio-economic crisis in Poland, the Jaruzelski government embarked on significant reform. 
Imports and public spending were supposed to be cut, and managers were to focus on 
profitable exports. Inspired by the 1968 Hungarian “New Economic Mechanism,” the 
government freed many prices from state control to encourage state-owned enterprises to 
become more responsive to domestic market needs.lxxxv  
Pagart was quick to restructure its work to suit the new economic conditions.lxxxvi Imports 
were cut: the number of pop performers visiting Poland from the socialist camp fell from 477 
in 1980 to 206 in 1981, and from the West from fifty-three in 1980 to thirty in 1981 (though 
Western imports included Tina Turner whom Pagart employees were particularly proud to 
have booked).lxxxvii The Poles’ empty pockets played an important role in this process, but 
falling imports were also partly due to socialist leaders’ reluctance to expose their citizens to 
the Polish political turmoil.lxxxviii Pagart further reoriented the export of culture away from the 
Soviet bloc and towards the West, especially in 1981 and 1982. Cutting exports to the 
people’s democracies, Pagart registered a 63 percent fall in transferable rouble profits from 
1980 to 1981. At the same time, as the agency exported more Polish performers to play for 
the diaspora in North America, as well as on long-term contracts at restaurants, cruise ships, 
and in other purely commercial contexts in the West, export turnover rose by 64 percent in 
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1982, and by a more modest seventeen percent in 1983. As a result, Pagart increased its US 
dollar profit in 1981 and 1982.lxxxix  
The new economic rules introduced by Jaruzelski’s government transformed the 
relationship between Pagart, regionally-based impressario agencies, and the Ministry of 
Culture and the Arts. Pagart needed to sell the pop acts they imported to regionally-based 
impressario agencies which subsequently organised individual concerts across Poland. After 
Jaruzelski’s reforms these entities were reluctant to book singers from the socialist camp for 
fear of making a loss. They preferred instead to focus on large Polish and Western rock 
concerts that guaranteed a profit.xc Like the domestic impressario agencies, Pagart also started 
to behave as an independent economic actor concerned with profit. In 1981, the agency sold 
fewer unprofitable concerts at home,xci but continued to make a loss on events that the 
government ordered to accompany important political events (it was up to Pagart to 
accommodate these losses in their annual budget). This changed in 1983, when Pagart began 
to charge the government to ensure a “modest profit” on the events it organised on behalf of 
the Ministry of Culture and the Arts.xcii Tours and concerts ordered by the government were 
not a reliable source of profit in subsequent years, suggesting that the ministry retained 
significant power to dictate financial terms to Pagart.xciii Yet intensified economic pressures 
on culture put Party apparatchiks concerned with “East European” identity building on the 
defensive. Unlike Pagart, Central Committee officials in charge of theatre and entertainment 
were uneasy about outward profit orientation and lobbied for the state to begin subsidising 
pop during the early 1980s to make sure that music continued to educate as well as to 
entertain.xciv  
Tensions between the commercial and the ideological visions of pop music were also 
palpable in the USSR. The parameters of discussion here were different because from 1979, 
“[a]fter a decade of relatively lively economic debates and experimentation, specialists were 
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discouraged in their attempts to put forward new ideas” and proponents of substantial 
economic reform were persecuted in the late 1970s. During the early 1980s, Andropov and 
Chernenko stressed the need for state-owned enterprises to balance their books, but placed 
more emphasis on work ethic as the key to fixing Soviet institutions.xcv In these 
circumstances, Soviet Party and government critics of commercialism in culture spoke in 
more confident tones than their Polish colleagues. In 1984, the Ministry of Culture 
complained that “the leadership of impressario agencies and cultural-educational institutions 
is still often guided by commercial considerations in organising pop music performances.”xcvi 
Similarly, the head of the Soviet Composers' Union Tikhon Khrennikov raised alarm at the 
CPSU Central Committee as he pointed out that impressario agencies ignored their mission to 
promote classical music in the race to meet centrally assigned financial targets. “Impressario 
agencies offer the best concert venues to [pop] groups, the majority of which are poor in the 
professional and artistic sense.”xcvii Such sweeping and uncompromising condemnation of 
commercialism in Soviet reports suggests that profit, while clearly crucial for state-owned 
impressario agencies, had not yet become broadly accepted as a legitimate concern of music 
professionals in the USSR.  
Instead, discipline was the catchword of Soviet reform during the early 1980s. Ukrainian 
and Estonian Ministry of Culture officials, as well as Goskontsert employees, faced stern 
warnings and dismissals after failing to ensure the participation of Soviet musicians in 
Czechoslovak popular music festivals in 1983.xcviii Pressures to improve work ethic were also 
present in early 1980s Poland.xcix What made the Soviet discipline campaign different from 
the Polish was a strong current of cultural conservatism. While Polish impressarios adjusted 
to popular demand, Soviet leaders staged a (largely inefficient) crackdown on forms of 
musical expression which had captivated the youth from the late 1970s.c Concerned about the 
influence of East European as well as Soviet Estonian music, for example, Lviv Party leaders 
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called on the Central Committee in Moscow to more carefully select pop musicians allowed 
to perform in western Ukraine.ci Their views were underpinned by rising doubts as to whether 
the “socialist world” (and even the USSR itself) represented a coherent cultural space.cii  
Advocates of tightening discipline in cultural institutions, and those who sought to 
increase profits on the import and export of music, had one thing in common: both groups 
called for devolving more decision-making powers to the level of impressario agencies. The 
fiercest critics of the commercial orientation in culture called for institutional reform. “The 
system of organising concerts that developed decades ago… needs substantial revisions,” 
wrote Khrennikov to the CPSU Central Committe. Impressario agencies were “governed by 
an enormous number of rules that … kill bottom-up initatives and stunt the development of 
musical life.”ciii Polish critics of commercial culture likewise hoped that freeing music 
professionals from excessive top-down control would allow for greater creativity. Jerzy 
Bisiak reasoned that impressario agencies would take more financial risks and invest in the 
development of both infrastructure and ambitious pop music if managers retained control 
over profits and financial surpluses (instead of paying everything into the state budget), and if 
impressario agencies were freed from rigid work plans and financial targets.civ  
The search to raise profit margins for state-owned enterprises in Poland was also linked 
with managerial reform. At the government level, Jaruzelski’s team stressed that the day-to-
day running of the economy was to be resolved within and between enterprises, with only 
long-term planning and control of the capital left to the centre.cv At the enterprise level, 
Pagart managers saw government interference as a threat to their economic mission, stressing 
for example that new limits on foreign travel imposed by the Ministry of Culture undermined 
the export of Polish pop to the Middle East that had been growing prior to 1983.cvi Despite 
bringing in US dollar profits, Pagart was still short of hard currency as they had to surrender 
most of it to the central state budget.cvii Well into the late 1980s, the fees that Pagart paid to 
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Polish singers and musicians were still limited by the law.cviii At the same time, Pagart 
directors prided themselves on their expertise which they contrasted with the incompetence of 
their more ideologically-oriented partners who did not seem to appreciate the importance of 
maintaining cordial relations with commercially successful artists. Pagart regretted delegating 
the management of Alla Pugacheva’s 1983 tour of Poland to the Soviet-Polish Friendship 
Society: Pugacheva’s performances were a sure source of profit that could then fund the 
Zielona Góra festival, but the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society threatened future cooperation 
with the singer by placing her musicians in bug-infested hotels.cix  
The autonomy of Pagart management was limited not only by the Polish state, but also by 
its rank-and-file employees. Whereas the Hungarian devolution of economic decision-making 
in the 1960s empowered the managerial class, massive strikes and the government’s fear of 
independent trade unions in Poland meant that the growing independence of enterprises 
translated into higher wages for workers.cx Pagart was not of course a massive factory or an 
important pressure group. Nonetheless, the average pay at Pagart rose by over 30 percent 
from 1980 to 1981.cxi Managers also faced pressure from musicians who complained that 
agency fees on foreign contracts were too high.cxii These trends continued into the late 1980s 
– in 1987, for example, wages at Pagart rose by 50 percent. In theory, the organisation’s 
increased profits should not have been eaten up by wage and bonus increases because salary 
budgets were just as much a percentage of profit as various infrastructural investment 
funds.cxiii As the Polish government went above enterprise managers’ heads and raised 
salaries for political reasons,cxiv however, managers had limited opportunities to develop new 
musical programmes or infrastructure because of the relative size of wage and bonus funds.cxv   
IV. The mid-1980s: East European networks loosened 
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Reform was very limited on both sides of the Polish-Soviet border in the mid-1980s. Yet 
Polish music professionals operated in a new environment in which the need to increase 
profits and contacts across the Iron Curtain undermined exchanges with the USSR. Although 
Goskontsert did not undergo similar reforms, its employees were not keen to restore loss-
making cultural contacts with the USSR’s largest but also most troublesome satellite. In this 
way, Pagart and (to a lesser extent) Goskontsert weakened cultural networks that bound the 
Soviet bloc together. 
Polish-Soviet concert tours began to recover in 1983. Pop still played an important role in 
events that celebrated “unbreakable friendship” between the USSR and its satellite states, 
such as the 1984 Polish Culture Days organised in the USSR to mark forty years of state 
socialism in Poland.cxvi Commercial tours arranged between Pagart and Goskontsert resumed, 
too.cxvii 
In their search for increased profit margins, however, Pagart found cultural cooperation 
within the bloc less important than contacts with the capitalist West. According to the agency, 
Zhanna Bichevskaia’s and Edyta Piecha’s 1984 tours of Poland were “attractive”, but the 
label of “cultural events of the season” was reserved for Elton John, Ray Charles, and Charles 
Aznavour. cxviii The heavy Western orientation of Polish cultural policy in the mid-1980s was 
evident at the Sopot international song festival, revived in 1984 after a three year hiatus. 
Sopot featured performers from around the socialist camp, including the Soviet Estonian 
Anne Veski who won an award in Sopot in 1984 and returned as a “star” in the following 
year. But it was Western singers certain to attract audiences who quite literally took the 
centre stage –for the first three days of the four-day festival in 1985, Shirley Bassey’s 
scenography provided the background for all performers. Audience preferences were 
especially important as the soaring costs of Sopot were to be covered by raising ticket prices 
(the most expensive tickets were originally supposed to cost 1000 złoty, but this was raised to 
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1800 złoty for the parts of the festival featuring Western stars). Despite shortcomings in 
advertising, Pagart considered the festival a success because Western impressario agencies 
showed some interest in importing Polish performers.cxix  
As profit margins preoccupied Polish officials in charge of the import and export of 
music, the Party and the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society had little influence over artists and 
bureaucrats who were hostile or, in the best case scenario, indifferent towards the idea of 
strengthening cultural ties between Poland and the USSR. One Central Committee report 
chastised the organisers of a special concert celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the 
liberation of Warsaw during the Second World War: with socialist camp delegations in the 
audience, the concert finale betrayed “completely unjustified cosmopolitanism and 
fascination with Western commercial culture” as Maryla Rodowicz covered the song 
“Susanna” by the Dutch group VOF de Kunst.cxx Musicians’ indifference to the heavily 
politicised festival in Zielona Góra became a favourite focus of criticism for music 
ideologues. In 1984, the Party’s Central Committee, activists of the official youth movement 
ZSMP, and enthusiastic members of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society despaired that 
amateur musicians, particularly among university students, showed little interest in the 
festival. They blamed schools and cultural institutions which had a “negative” or 
“indifferent” attitude to Soviet music. Meanwhile, festival organisers maintained, music 
professionals treated work in Zielona Góra as a chore or perhaps a source of political 
embarassment. Journalists wrote superficial reviews of the festival, presenters on stage could 
not pronounce the Russian names of songs and performers, and popular bands that had earlier 
toured the USSR (such as Budka Suflera) outright refused to participate. Facing a boycott of 
Zielona Góra by many leading performers, the organisers reluctantly invited the pop-rock 
bands Bajm and Wanda i Banda to play at the festival. The bands’ electric guitar sound 
differed from the more lyrical Soviet pop repertoire, making the festival “stylistically 
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incoherent” and thus highlighting differences between the USSR and its allies.cxxi Because of 
the transnational dimension of the festival, Zielona Góra was not only a Polish problem – 
Soviet Party apparatchiks likewise complained that they had too little influence over the 
“ideological and artistic” side of the event.cxxii  
Conflicting visions of popular music found their advocates in Poland’s public sphere. The 
more liberal press offered a forum to those who saw music primarily as a professional, and 
not an ideological, pursuit. In 1985, the weekly Polityka published an interview with Maryla 
Rodowicz, whom they dubbed the ‘Madonna of the Comecon’ on account of her popularity 
in the USSR and other people’s democracies.cxxiii Asked whether she thought it appropriate to 
prepare a new repertoire in light of the political turmoil of the previous few years, like the 
more rebellious rock bands whose music supposedly reflected widespread “bitterness” among 
society, Rodowicz hinted that she too sympathised with the anti-regime opposition. But she 
also emphatically claimed: “I am a singer, not a safety valve for social moods!... I have 
always been and I will remain a commercial singer. This is a conscious choice, but the 
important caveat is that I want to do [my job] professionally… I do not want to force a poor 
quality product on people when it is already forced on them everywhere.” At the same time, 
Rodowicz complained that shortages of equipment and money in East European 
entertainment industry stunted the development of new talent and ideas.cxxiv In other cases, 
newspapers chastised Polish performers for their lack of commitment to friendship with the 
USSR. One article asked rhetorically whether Zielona Góra lay too far out of the way for 
Polish performers when the USSR was able to send Alla Pugacheva herself to headline the 
1983 final concert.cxxv  
In contrast to their Polish colleagues, Soviet Party leaders and music professionals did not 
openly reflect on the depth or the causes of cultural tensions in the socialist camp. 
Pugacheva’s short speech at the end of the 1983 televised concert in Zielona Góra echoed 
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narratives of Czechoslovak normalisation, where popular culture turned citizens’ attention 
away from politics and towards the challenges of finding happiness among family, friends, 
and colleagues: “I hope we can soon leave all our problems behind in song… And I wish us 
all peace and calm, so that we can focus on singing and enjoying life.”cxxvi The Soviet press 
downplayed long-term consequences of the Polish political crisis. Acknowledging in 1984 
that the number of participants in the Zielona Góra song competition had fallen at the height 
of the Solidarity crisis, the newspaper Komsomol’skaia pravda repeated familiar propaganda 
statements about Polish audiences’ “love for Soviet songs” and dismissed the apparent 
cultural problems as a temporary setback caused by a group of Solidarity saboteurs and 
American imperialists.cxxvii Even in reports aimed at a narrow circle of readers, Soviet 
officials found it difficult to meaningfully analyse the USSR's cultural relations with Poland. 
To explain why Polish tours of the USSR were severely cut back in 1982, Goskontsert 
employees resorted to the laboured statement that “artistic exchanges develop[ed] in light of 
the complicated prevailing situation.”cxxviii  
Yet pretending that long-established forms of cultural cooperation actually worked 
became increasingly difficult even for the Soviet side. Most troubling were direct political 
challenges to Soviet performers on tour in Poland. Following a 1985 concert in Szczecin, 
none other than the regional Party secretary in charge of propaganda “embarrassed” the 
Soviet Estonian singer Anne Veski, her Goskontsert guides, and the Soviet vice-consul who 
accompanied the group. He asked them to study an illegal opposition pamphlet and enquired 
whether Veski had encountered any hostility from Szczecin’s “very active” underground.cxxix  
While politics cast a shadow over Soviet-Polish cultural cooperation, however, it was 
economics that loomed larger. Aware that political upheavals sparked the near-boycott of 
Polish artists and performers in the USSR in 1981, the Central Committee in Warsaw 
identified deeper roots of the crisis in their Soviet colleagues’ need to cut spending.cxxx They 
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likewise concluded that the reason why Soviet-bloc artists were reluctant to perform in each 
other’s countries was not only a certain lack of prestige associated with touring the second 
world, but also the inflexible system of royalties.cxxxi  
V. The late 1980s: Eastern European cultural networks dismantled 
Gorbachev's economic policies were quick to bring Goskontsert in line with their more 
profit-oriented Polish partners. From 1986, Goskontsert leadership boldly defended the 
commercial orientation for which they had been attacked earlier in the decade. As Pagart and 
Goskontsert management faced rising competition in the music industry, they organised 
international concerts within the socialist camp, but also questioned whether large state-
owned agencies that made up Eastern Europe’s cultural networks were able to respond to the 
needs and tastes of Soviet-bloc audiences. 
The term khozrashchet, “roughly analogous to enterprise accounting in Western business 
parlance,”cxxxii marked the limits of reform in the Soviet state sector between 1986 and 1990. 
The idea that state enterprise managers, having fulfilled centrally assigned plans, could then 
trade in products and services to boost their budgets built on Kosygin's abortive reforms of 
the 1960s. Given that state monopolies were only gradually challenged by new laws on 
cooperatives and individual labour activity, khozrashchet certainly did not mean the 
introduction of a free market. Nevertheless, it sparked resistance among branch economic 
ministries and central organs such as Gossnab which stood to lose their power vis-a-vis 
individual enterprises.cxxxiii For their part, Goskontsert leadership was quick to embrace the 
new language of khozrashchet to justify a commercial orientation. “The ever rising number of 
unprofitable international concert tours … is not within Goskontsert's financial means at this 
stage and they harm khozrashchet,” stated the organisation's report for 1986. The pressures of 
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reform meant that Goskontsert had to compromise between their mission to educate through 
classical music and to make money through pop.cxxxiv  
Goskontsert management saw khozraschet as a way to address deep-rooted issues which 
music professionals were attuned to more than Communist Party or Ministry of Culture 
officials. Infrastructural problems and material shortages, already evident in 1970s reports, 
were now openly discussed in the context of new investments that Goskontsert would make 
after establishing control over its own budget.cxxxv Moreover, just as their colleagues at 
Pagart, Goskontsert directors saw their newly acquired powers as a way to motivate 
employees through higher wages and bonuses. They therefore opted for a form of 
khozrashchet that tied bonuses to profits; the plan was to reward employees for creative and 
economic success.cxxxvi In the late 1980s, Goskontsert and Pagart further began to look 
towards redundancies as a means of raising wages within their respective enterprises.cxxxvii  
The search for profits fuelled conflicts between Goskontsert leadership and the Soviet 
Ministry of Culture which still retained a great degree of financial control. Before 1989, 
Goskontsert paid a large proportion of its coveted hard currency profits into a special 
“centralised hard currency fund” at the Ministry of Culture.cxxxviii This system deprived 
Goskontsert of the money needed to cover cultural exchanges and thus made the agency 
dependent on ministry funding.cxxxix The June 1987 “Law on State Enterprise” promised 
state-owned enteprises more control over their finances, but did not deprive ministries of the 
power to impose targets.cxl When implemented at Goskontsert in January 1989, the law freed 
the management from budgetary contributions to the Ministry of Culture. In addition, 
Goskontsert now kept control over all unusused Soviet rouble subsidies that it received from 
the ministry.cxli Nevertheless, the Ministry of Culture retained significant power to direct 
Goskontsert's work. As price liberalisation was delayed for fear of social unrest,cxlii the 
agency gained the right to negotiate prices for the export and import of music, but could still 
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only adjust concert ticket prices within state-imposed brackets.cxliii Goskontsert was obliged 
to assist in the USSR's foreign policy initiatives on the ministry's orders. Such events were 
paid for by the Ministry of Culture, but Goskontsert's management was in a losing position as 
it was the ministry that decided on both the number of such events and the size of the 
subsidies. The ministry was in fact reluctant to approve financial reports submitted by 
Goskontsert and rarely reimbursed the agency on time.cxliv In other words, Gorbachev's 
reforms pushed Goskontsert to search for increased profit margins, but also left it at the 
mercy of a ministry that cared little about the agency's finances.  
These half-measures had a detrimental effect on Soviet-Polish cultural cooperation. The 
commercially-oriented Pagart and Goskontsert had limited interest in each other. True, 
commercial pop tours within the socialist camp continued even as state-owned impressarios 
focused on Western imports such as the British UB-40 or the Italian Al Bano and Romina 
Power.cxlv Pagart even attracted the wrath of the Polish Party Central Committee as it treated 
Soviet imports like any other form of commercial activity.cxlvi Unlike large symphonic 
orchestras or theatre groups, exports and imports of pop music within the socialist camp had 
the potential to boost Goskontsert's budget – from January 1989, profits made on intrabloc 
exchanges stayed within Goskontsert so long as they involved groups of artists under twenty 
people.cxlvii The problem was that the Ministry of Culture pocketed all hard currency profits 
on events that it ordered and subsidised. Consequently, with no limits on the number of such 
events, Goskontsert had too little hard currency to invest in profitable imports and exports of 
its own.cxlviii This made cooperation between Pagart and Goskontsert difficult. Hoping to 
purchase Western recording licences in 1989, Goskontsert turned to Pagart as an 
intermediary, but it was only able to offer payment in kind. Given that Pagart was itself short 
of hard curency, the Poles rejected the proposal. cxlix  
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Goskontsert’s commercial orientation further helped to reorient its ideological activities 
away from the socialist camp. Performers who had earlier played a prominent role in Soviet 
cultural diplomacy in Eastern Europe were now primed for cultural exchanges across the Iron 
Curtain. Already in the early 1980s, Goskontsert had to deny requests to send Alla Pugacheva 
to accompany some Soviet foreign policy initiatives: the singer was arguably the most 
successful Soviet pop export and her annual schedule filled up very quickly. cl In the second 
half of the decade, Goskontsert planned Pugacheva’s foreign tours so as to intensify exchages 
with Western Europe. This was partly because such concerts helped to promote a positive 
image of Gorbachev’s policy initiatives at a time when the USSR sought a rapprochement 
with the West. Pugacheva’s September 1987 performance in Duisburg thus helped celebrate 
the West German communist party’s newspaper, Unsere Zeit, as well as to popularise 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s nuclear disarmament initatives. Equally important, however, 
Goskontsert saw Pugacheva’s participation in such highly politicized events as a prelude to 
purely commercial activities in Switzerland and the FRG. The plan was to cooperate with the 
West German concert agency Lippmann and Rau to organize a “normal commercial” tour for 
Pugacheva in the aftermath of her performance in Duisburg (Goskontsert’s German partners 
had mentioned the possibility of a “modest commercial” success), partly to offset the costs of 
the concert in Duisburg, but also to open new markets for the singer through mass advertising 
campaigns on West German national television and radio. Goskontsert employees also hoped 
that cooperation with Lippmann and Rau would allow them to import American performers 
such as Stevie Wonder and Carlos Santana. They would visit the USSR while touring West 
Germany and Poland, thus significantly reducing transport costs.cli  
Music professionals feared that the pop performances within the socialist bloc which they 
organised on government orders were out of touch with audience demand. The first Polish song 
festival held in the Soviet town of Vitebsk in 1988 exemplified the shortcomings of politicised 
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cultural exchanges coordinated by Party and government officials. As a mirror image of 
Zielona Góra, the festival was in many ways a product of glasnost and perestroika. It comprised 
multi-level competitions for amateurs performing Polish pop repertoire in different parts of the 
USSR, and a televised final concert with the participation of Polish and Soviet celebrities. In 
other words, while Zielona Góra had long been used to spread Soviet culture in Poland, Vitebsk 
now undermined imperial cultural hierarchies by attempting to spread Polish culture in the 
USSR.clii But precisely because the festival was conceived as a Soviet response to Zielona 
Góra,cliii it resembled Party-driven initiatives of the Brezhnev days that were widely out of line 
with the late 1980s emphasis on profits. In contrast to commercial festivals held in the same 
year,cliv advertising was conspicuously absent from the centre stage.clv The Polish press was 
quick to comment on politicians’ indifference to profit at Vitebsk. “Once again, it turned out 
that we do not know how to sell our product,” wrote Piotr Sarzyński in Polityka. The journalist 
believed that there was strong potential to sell Russian-language publications on Polish music 
in the USSR and even challenged the “official Polish delegation – the navigators of our cultural 
policy” on this topic during a press conference, only to hear that “there was no need” to invest 
in promotional material. The audience had a clear preference for Soviet celebrities and young 
Polish pop-rock bands, but the festival programme showed that the organisers were mentally 
stuck in the 1970s, as a result of which many songs met with a cool reception among the Soviet 
public. The Polityka article epitomised the fears of music professionals uncertain about the 
future of Polish-Soviet cultural cooperation at a time when Party control over culture in the 
USSR slowly crumbled: “Is this really a good indicator of our popularity here, … is the 
political-cultural decision to stage this festival in line with the real cultural needs of Russian 
people”?clvi 
On the Soviet side of the border, Soviet music professionals registered listeners’ opinions 
which also fuelled doubts about their role as mediators of audience taste. Between 1985 and 
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1987, the Soviet radio received thousands of letters which variously welcomed or bemoaned 
changes in the USSR’s pop repertoire, reflecting the widespread perception that Soviet-bloc 
culture was in flux. Calling for more airtime to be devoted to Western pop such as Italian 
disco, as well as good-quality Soviet rock music, some young letter writers cited the example 
of the Polish music industry to argue that Soviet broadcasters should better reflect the 
changing tastes of the younger generation. As one writer from Minsk put it, the hosts of 
music shows for young people could perhaps “risk following the Polish example” and allow 
listeners to phone in. Another letter from Moscow suggested that Soviet music professionals 
could copy Polish programs that targeted particular generations, instead of producing shows 
that aimed to find a middle ground to please the whole spectrum of the audience.clvii  
Anxieties about Party and government interference in music fed into broader debates 
about state ownership in culture. Subjected to Party and government controls, state-owned 
impressario agencies found it difficult to compete against non-state actors. The problem was 
not new in Poland. Pagart had earlier competed for artists’ time against privately and 
cooperatively owned record labels that emerged in the late 1970s and got a further boost in 
1985 (though they did not import or export live music).clviii The so-called “second stage of 
economic reform” turned non-state actors into more powerful competition for Pagart between 
1987 and 1989. With restrictions on private activities and foreign capital investment relaxed, 
and with the tax system favouring private entrepreneurs over the state sector, newly founded, 
mostly small-scale private companies grew from strength to strength.clix Polish performers 
keen to play abroad escaped Pagart for other agencies that arranged concerts for smaller fees 
and ignored the wage controls that still limited what Pagart paid its artists.clx The Ministry of 
Culture in Warsaw was painfully aware of these dynamics, but their government colleagues 
in charge of economic reform were unmoved by requests to limit private activities, and hinted 
that the new impressario agencies would help to reorient Polish cultural exports away from 
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the traditional markets of the Soviet bloc. Competition between state and private impressario 
agencies will help to diversify Poland’s foreign cultural relations, claimed the Minister for 
Foreign Economic Cooperation Dominik Jastrzębski in response to Ministry of Culture 
complaints in December 1988.clxi  
Although a robust private sector did not emerge across Poland's eastern border,clxii 
competition in the music industry also played an important role in the USSR from 1988, 
when Soviet citizens gained the right to set up cooperatives.clxiii Goskontsert saw cooperatives 
as a force with which they had to reckon: the management now feared that artists would 
simply take their services and agency fees elsewhere so long as they were forced to file 
paperwork in several different offices to travel abroad through Goskontsert. The proposed 
solution was to train a new cadre of managers who would take care of a particular artist's 
business from start to finish.clxiv Attempts to streamline bureaucratic procedures were too 
little, too late. Like private actors in Poland, Soviet cooperatives and other organisations that 
gained the right to organise concerts posed a major threat to the state sector because they 
were not subject to wage controls. By April 1989, they seriously undermined the work of 
state-owned impressario agencies, leading the RSFSR Ministry of Culture to conclude that 
such major players as Moskontsert and Lenkontsert could not fulfil their five-year plans 
because other organisations tempted commercially successful pop acts away with higher 
wages.clxv  
The new cultural networks that began to emerge in parallel and in competition with the 
state sector were not “Eastern European” both because they undermined Cold War 
hierarchies, and because they exposed conflicts within the Soviet bloc. In 1987, for example, 
Goskontsert dealt with a private Hungarian impressario representing the West German band 
Modern Talking. Goskontsert was weary of the man who clearly had the reputation of a 
womaniser, with one internal memo specifying that under no circumstances should he be 
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allocated a female interpreter during a visit to Moscow, but they were also keen to book the 
popular group. For his part, the Hungarian impressario treated the Soviet state-owned agency 
in a condescending manner, sending telegrams reminding Goskontsert that he and his clients 
were successful professionals who would not put up with the Soviet bureaucracy. Ultimately, 
although Modern Talking gave concerts in Poland and Yugoslavia, their 1987 visit to the 
USSR was not to be as Goskontsert was too slow in responding to the Hungarian 
businessman.clxvi Reflecting broader structural changes in Soviet-bloc politics, the incident 
highlighted the collapse of distinct Eastern European cultural networks in which Goskontsert 
represented the dominant power. The Hungarian impressario clearly emphasised that he 
represented the interests of a commercial West German band, and not a government of the 
USSR's ally.  
At the same time, international concerts arranged outside the old state-owned impressario 
agencies exposed deep political and cultural rifts in Eastern Europe. When the Polish rock 
band Woo-Woo performed in Vilnius in 1988 as part of a rock festival organised by a newly 
formed organisation ‘Centras’ (uniting local Komsomol activists and employees of a music 
club), Marek Gajewski’s Polityka article celebrated how diverse Soviet and East European 
culture had become over the previous two years, but also pointed to deep divisions that 
diversity entailed. Soviet Lithuania was worlds apart from Soviet Ukraine, where Woo-Woo 
performed a few days before: as young people danced by the stage in Vilnius, in Kyiv they 
still sat quietly surrounded by hordes of militia. Political tensions were palpable in Lithuania, 
too, as performers and the public called for national independence and spoke of recent 
government crackdowns on rock music. In Gajewski’s article, political divisions and cultural 
freedoms went hand-in-hand with commercial success: the festival’s non-state organisers 
covered all the costs (100,000 roubles) on ticket sales, a feat that seemed out of reach for 
most major festival organisers in Poland.clxvii 
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By 1989, networks devoted to creating cultural unity in Eastern Europe were no more. 
Party and government control over music crumbled as Pagart and Goskonsert management 
escaped into the non-state sector. Between 1987 and 1989, during the “first stage of political 
capitalism” in Poland, state assets were leased to private entrepreneurs and failing state 
enterprises were turned into joint stock companies. This allowed state enterprise managers to 
acquire private control over public assets. Taking advantage of nomenklatura connections, 
they bought stocks in public companies at deflated prices, acquired lucrative import licences, 
sold political protection and local expertise to foreign investors, cashed in on the sales of 
state-owned real estate, and used state capital as the basis for the functioning of their own 
spin-off companies.clxviii Soviet state sector managers likewise took advantage of the fact that 
cooperatives, free from price controls, could be attached to state enterprises. They used state 
infrastructure for non-state economic activity, stripped public assets by paying “friendly” 
cooperatives inflated prices for real or ficticious services to their enterprises, and shared in 
the profits that cooperatives made on buying cheap produce at state prices and selling it on 
the free market.clxix These developments effectively amounted to stealing public property and, 
unsurprisingly, it is difficult to trace how far these processes affected Pagart and Goskontsert. 
It is particularly hard to identify the individuals who pushed for and benefitted from the 
privatization of the socialist camp’s impressario agencies.  
What is clear is that Party apparatchiks in Warsaw believed that state-owned impressario 
agencies full-heartedly embraced the non-state sector. The managers sold their concerts to a 
wide range of organisers who, while inflating ticket prices, failed to arrange appropriate 
conditions for “prestigious performances by foreign guests.”clxx “The hapless slogan about 
self-financing in culture coined in the early 1980s,” claimed one 1987 report, “means that 
popular entertainment, something that could really finance itself, is in the hands of various 
social movements, cultural institutions, youth organisations, and trade unions that see it as a 
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fix-it-all remedy for their own broken budgets.” Profitable concerts, the report emphasised, 
were organised by individuals who have long left state enterprises and institutions.clxxi 
Meanwhile, in 1988, Goskontsert stressed that it was of utmost importance to delegate 
concert organisation to newly formed cooperatives and thus to escape state-imposed norms 
on cultural imports from the socialist camp.clxxii In October 1990, Goskontsert employees 
applied to rent the agency's assets as a cooperative in their own right.clxxiii  
VI. Conclusion:  
Particularly in the former USSR, but also in its satellite states, the last years of 
Brezhnev’s rule are often associated with harmony, stability, and relative prosperity. In 
contrast, perestroika is remembered as a prelude to the 1990s, a time of unsuccessful and 
unnecessary reforms that brought about a time of economic hardship. This article challenges 
these periodisations as it reconstructs the late 1970s and the early 1980s as a period of unease 
caused by the belief that Soviet and Eastern European institutions were not working, 
widespread among mid-level bureucrats and entrepreneurs who managed Soviet-bloc imports 
and exports outside the strategic and heavily-subsidised industries. It further identifies strong 
roots of enthusiasm for market reform during the 1980s. Pointing to socio-political unrest in 
Poland as the spark behind changes in Eastern European cultural politics, it nevertheless 
shifts emphasis away from dissidents and protest towards professionals in state-owned 
enterprises and economic reform as the key to understanding why Eastern Europeans lost 
faith in a common future.  
What made Soviet-bloc attempts to create a distinct “Eastern European” culture unique 
was also what made cultural institutions in the socialist camp inefficient and stifling. In 
Poland and the USSR, the state enjoyed a monopoly on the import and export of live music. 
The lack of competition in the concert industry confined audiences to cold auditoriums with 
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substandard sound equipment. Quite apart from Pagart’s and Goskontsert’s respective 
monopolies, Eastern European music was plagued by powerful party leaders, friendship 
society activists, and ministry of culture bureaucrats whose influence was slow to wane over 
the 1980s.  
Music professionals found that ideological activists limited their initiative and creativity. 
Subject to government-imposed targets, budgets, and price controls, impressario agency 
employees and performers aspired to make professional entertainment. During the 1970s, 
they expressed alarm at the inefficiencies of Soviet-bloc institutions which made this task 
difficult. Yet they could not do much beyond calling for more empathy for the viewers and 
the performers, particularly in the USSR where economic and infrastructural problems were 
still swept under the carpet when Gorbachev came to power. Popular culture narratives of a 
happy life under socialism were therefore far removed from the actual experience of 
producing culture.  
My focus on Soviet-Polish concert tours reveals how discord within the socialist camp, 
less palpable in the USSR’s relations with other satellite states, subsequently shaped cultural 
relations in the 1980s. Many other forms of transnational contacts within the socialist camp 
and across the Iron Curtain did not suffer setbacks akin to the Soviet-Polish cultural 
exchanges in the sphere of pop, and they still reflected the belief that state socialism provided 
meaningful pathways to change well into the late 1980s.clxxiv Moreover, the shifts in pop 
professionals’ approaches to business and culture did not occur simultaneously in the USSR 
and Poland. During the early 1980s, outside the context of Soviet-Polish interactions, 
bureaucrats who managed the USSR’s external interface were stuck in their ways. For 
instance, professionals who oversaw Western tourism in the USSR faced infrastructural 
problems which frustrated their “mission to gain hard currency,” but they “entered the 1980s 
in a state of seeming stability.” As strong distinctions between East and West “remained 
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intact” in the minds of Soviet elites and the wider population, Alex Hazanov argues, 
Intourist’s “responses to the global age” were still structured by “a deep autarchic, 
xenophobic institutional substratum”.clxxv The world of Soviet pop was not quite as immune 
to reformist ideas: even some of the harshest critics of “commercial orientation in culture” 
suggested that impressario agencies should be subject to fewer top-down controls, and Pagart 
employees hinted that their Soviet counterparts sought to limit unprofitable exchanges within 
the socialist camp. Still, Party and Ministry of Culture ideologues retained the power to direct 
Goskontsert activities through the mid-1980s, protecting Soviet culture from “harmful” 
foreign influences.  
At the same time, however, the popular culture image of the socialist camp as a space 
distinct from the capitalist West was seriously undermined after the rise of Solidarity. As 
economic and institutional reform freed Polish pop impressarios from ideological oversight, 
the ties that underpinned “Eastern European” mental geographies in Polish and Soviet 
popular culture began to crumble several years before the onset of perestroika in the USSR. 
To be sure, conflicts and confrontations had long rocked the Soviet bloc, but they had mostly 
inspired a search for change within the imagined socialist space. Memories of the Prague 
Spring were still fresh during the 1980s, for example, helping to mould Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
attempts to build “democratised and humanised socialism.”clxxvi Equally important, tourist 
travel between the USSR and Eastern Europe reflected anxieties about the future of 
socialism, but also attempts to spread Soviet ideas and practices in the people’s 
democracies.clxxvii In contrast, Polish-Soviet relations during the early 1980s marked a decline 
of the search for “mutual understanding” in the socialist camp.clxxviii With the onset of 
Gorbachev’s reforms, Polish and Soviet pop impressarios showed little interest in fixing 
mutual cultural relations which had begun to unravel earlier in the decade as they prioritized 
commercial over ideological considerations in their work. Whereas the success of Chinese 
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market reforms during the 1980s provided a “trump card” for those Soviet officials who 
sought to restructure central planning without undermining Communist Party hold over 
society and culture,clxxix the breakdown in Polish-Soviet relations sparked by the Solidarity 
crisis provided a setting in which Polish and then Soviet professionals translated economic 
reform into a new type of international cultural relations over which the Party had little 
control.  
Although this article is a story of demise, it is also a tale of new beginnings. As Alexei 
Yurchak has shown, many urban young people in the USSR developed diverse beliefs and 
lifestyles without ever questioning the character or longevity of the dominant social, political, 
and cultural practices of late socialism.clxxx Among the increasingly well-educated 
professionals, however, ambitions to mimick Western lifestyles as well as cultural 
confrontations within the socialist bloc fuelled the belief that things did not have to stay as 
they were. Free enterprise offered a way to escape the political and institutional constraints 
that music professionals faced in the socialist bloc. Mid-level bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and 
performers gradually gained the power to decide what cultural services to sell at home and 
abroad, as well as to control how profits they made on the import and export of culture were 
distributed. They also pursued closer cultural ties across the Iron Curtain which brought 
higher profits, opened opportunities to invest in new equipment and to cooperate with popular 
artists, and (in their assessment) appealed to the mass audience.clxxxi With less success, the 
professionals also tried to retain within their enterprises the hard-currency reserves in US 
dollars which they accumulated through exports to the capitalist West, as well as to weaken 
government-imposed price controls which they saw as an obstacle to professional success.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore how far the market fulfilled the hopes of 
music professionals during the 1990s, though the advent of capitalism no doubt had its winners 
and losers in the music industry. Already during the late 1980s, some pop professionals in the 
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Soviet bloc began to look at the market as a mixed blessing. In Poland, “private presses 
[created] opportunities for bands that otherwise would not have had the opportunity to record,” 
but also “brought a new sort of restriction in the form of complicated contracts designed to 
extract profit from musicians.” Similarly, Soviet artists welcomed Western private investors 
and the newly formed cooperatives as an alternative to state-owned enterprises which, in their 
view, created very limited opportunities to record and perform, but also found that the capitalist 
music industry limited the “small spaces of freedom” which the socialist system with its 
inefficient oversight had offered.clxxxii 
What is clear is that infrastructural and economic reform was linked intimately with a 
cultural reorientation of the Soviet bloc. For music professionals, the need to cater to popular 
tastes left little room for networks created to promulgate a very rigidly defined culture of 
Eastern Europe. As profits became a central concern through the 19580s, Pagart and 
subsequently Goskontsert employees jumped at the opportunity to reorient pop music away 
from Eastern European cultural networks and towards exchanges across the Iron Curtain. 
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